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Legal commentators widely agree that forensic examiners should articulate the 
reasons for their opinions. However, findings from cognitive science strongly suggest 
that people have little insight into the information they rely on to make decisions. And 
as individuals gain expertise, they rely more on cognitive shortcuts that are not directly 
accessible through introspection. That is to say, the expert’s mind is a black box — both 
to the expert and to the trier of fact. This article focuses on black box expertise in the 
context of forensic examiners who interpret visual pattern evidence (eg fingerprints). 
The authors review black box expertise through the lens of cognitive scientific research. 
They then suggest that the black box nature of this expertise strains common law 
admissibility rules and trial safeguards. 
I   INTRODUCTION 
The child who tries to open a door has to manipulate the handle (the input) so as to 
produce the desired movement at the latch (the output); and he has to learn how to 
control the one by the other without being able to see the internal mechanism that 
links them. In our daily lives we are confronted at every turn with systems whose 
internal mechanisms are not fully open to inspection ...1 
When forensic scientists provide evidence in court, they bear the significant 
responsibility of clearly and accurately explaining their opinion to an audience 
that cannot be expected to share their level of knowledge. One of the most 
important matters for forensic scientists who interpret visual pattern evidence 
(eg handwriting, hair, shoeprints, fingerprints, voiceprints, bullets, toolmarks, 
bitemarks, blood, and imagery of various kinds) is their cognitive process or how 
they ‘think’. In the lab, scientists are encouraged to report the basis of their claims 
by showing and sharing their methods, raw data and the analytic code that 
reproduces their results.2 Forensic scientists who deal with visual pattern 
 
                                                                    
* School of Psychology, The University of Adelaide.  
†  Sydney Law School; Institute for Globally Distributed Open Research and Education (‘IGDORE’). 
1  W Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics: The Black Box (Chapman & Hall, 1956) 117. 
2  For a review of open research practices in science, see BA Spellman, EA Gilbert and KS Corker, 
‘Open Science: What, Why, and How’ in J Wixted & E-J Wagenmakers (eds), Stevens’ Handbook of 
Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience (John Wiley, 4th ed, 2018) vol 5, 729. For a review 
238  Black Box Evidence  2019  
 
evidence in the courtroom, however, cannot show their work in this way because 
the ‘analysis’ occurs in their mind. The cognitive processes underpinning their 
judgments and decisions hum along in the background just outside of awareness.3 
In other words, forensic experts, in many cases, are black box thinking machines 
whose internal workings are not fully open to introspection.  
In this article, we draw on findings from cognitive science to explore the 
extent to which forensic experts can articulate their reasoning about visual 
pattern evidence (Parts II–III). Then, in Part IV, we go on to discuss the orthodox 
ways in which courts regulate expert evidence, and how those mechanisms strain 
in the light of the opaque nature of black box experts. Finally, we conclude in Part 
V with a suggestion that black box expert witnesses perhaps provide some 
information about the cognitive science that underpins their decisions. In other 
words, they should acknowledge what they know and what they do not know 
about their thinking. 
II   THE EXPERT AND THE EVIDENCE 
 
Recent controversies and miscarriages of justice involving forensic science have 
resulted in scrutiny from peak scientific and legal bodies in a number of 
jurisdictions.4 At the core of concerns about the value of forensic science lies the 
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problem that humans are fallible, and many forms of forensic evidence rely 
principally on human interpretation of visual pattern evidence. Progress has been 
made in estimating the accuracy of examiners’ judgments about evidence of this 
kind. But understanding how and when such judgments can go right (or awry) is 
complicated by the fact that they result from difficult-to-observe cognitive 
processes. 
A 2016 report prepared by the United States President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology (‘PCAST’) offers one of the most comprehensive 
reviews of human performance in forensic science to date.5 A working group of 
leading scientists and legal scholars were assembled to review empirical evidence 
for the accuracy of several commonly used forms of visual pattern evidence, 
including bitemarks, fingerprints, firearms, footwear and hair. The authors of the 
report recognised the opacity of an examiner’s thinking by referring to it as the 
‘black box in the examiner’s head’. In response, they suggest that the 
‘foundational’ scientific validity of forensic practices can only be established by 
measuring human performance across many examiners and many independent 
cases.6 Further, they suggest that foundationally valid methods must then be 
validly applied to the instant case. This can be demonstrated by examiners 
showing they are ‘capable of reliably applying the method’ and have ‘actually 
reliably applied the method’.7 We understand ‘the method’ to include the 
examiner’s thinking at the time of the examination in addition to any external 
workflows and frameworks they may have used.8  
In the context of fingerprint evidence, these criteria require the examiner to 
report their individual proficiency test results, the features they marked on the 
prints, a written explanation of how they selected and compared those features in 
the prints, their awareness of other facts in the case that might influence the 
results, and a judgment about the sufficient ‘quality’ of the prints.9 The trouble is 
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that the ‘features’ marked on the crime-scene print during analysis may have 
limited bearing on the features actually used when comparing it to the candidate 
or suspect print (see Part III below). And the examiner’s explanation of how they 
selected and compared the different visual features may bear little resemblance 
to how they actually arrived at a decision. Moreover, different experts can apply 
different cognitive strategies to the same cases at different times and still 
consistently arrive at a correct response. That is, experts’ conclusions can be 
reliable, even when the ‘method’ is idiosyncratic.  
By way of example, fingerprint examiners visually compare latent prints 
found at a crime scene with highly similar known prints found through a search 
of a national database.10 This perceptual task is made more challenging by natural 
variation and distortion in how the same finger impresses on different surfaces at 
different times, with changing pressure, perspiration, positioning and 
movement. The expert examiner can resolve this superficial variation to detect 
prints from the same finger far more accurately than novices,11 and with 89 per 
cent repeatability,12 despite evidence of considerable variation in their judgments 
of value and marking of features in prints from one occasion to the next.13 In any 
given case, at any given time, the expert may see the same set of features 
differently through the lens of their experience. But reliable feature marking does 
not appear to be necessary to achieve a high degree of accuracy in fingerprint 
comparison conclusions.  
In reviewing validation efforts for several forms of visual pattern evidence, 
the PCAST Report emphasised their ‘subjective’ nature, where accuracy or (legal) 
reliability are bound by human judgment or the expert’s interpretation of the 
evidence.14 That is to say, the expert and the evidence in such cases are 
inextricably linked.15 But the Report also defines expert opinion as the subjective 
application of a ‘method’ of examining the evidence. Confusingly, this definition 
implies an intermediary between the expert and the evidence that can be reliably 
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independent of the expert. On the contrary, the expert and the intermediating 
method are one and the same, as Simon Cole vividly captures with this analogy:  
There is no methodology without a practitioner, any more than there is an automobile 
without a driver and claiming to have an error rate without the practitioner is akin to 
calculating the crash rate of an automobile, provided it is not driven.16 
We would add that the driver need not know how the engine runs to successfully 
navigate in traffic, any more than the forensic practitioner need know how their 
mind works to successfully interpret samples of evidence. And as we discuss in 
Part III, the most expert of examiners may not have special insight into how they 
interpret evidence because their cognitive processes (ie their method) proceed 
automatically in a black box.  
There are other approaches to expert testimony thought to make an 
examiner’s opinion evidence more transparent and thus easier to evaluate in the 
instant case. These include probabilistic approaches, for instance, where a 
statistical model estimates the likelihood of specific feature similarities in the 
case at hand.17 This quantitative approach is routinely used to communicate the 
strength of DNA evidence, where the features are well-defined and predictable. 
Visual pattern evidence, by comparison, has proven more difficult to capture 
quantitatively.18 As a result, it is currently left to the examiner adopting this 
approach to evaluate the probability of particular feature similarities in their 
minds. Proponents argue that expressing the human reasoning process as a 
likelihood ratio or verbal equivalent (eg correspondence between the writing on 
the wall at the crime scene and the writing of the accused is ‘64 times more likely’ 
(numerical), or ‘offers strong support’ for the proposition they originated by the 
same author compared with different authors (verbal)) is more transparent.19 
Such an argument assumes that the examiner is intimately aware of how they 
weigh particular features to compute and express their probability. That is, this 
approach assumes experts have an accurate read out of their own thinking — an 
almost unbelievable feat of self-awareness, as we will now discuss. 
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95 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 985, 1039. 
17  C Neumann, I W Evett and J Skerrett, ‘Quantifying the Weight of Evidence from a Forensic 
Fingerprint Comparison: A New Paradigm’ (2012) 175 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A 
(Statistics in Society) 371, 415.  
18  AAAS Report (n 4) 23: ‘Because the characteristics of fingerprints are unlikely to be statistically 
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19  For an analysis of how different expressions of forensic opinion evidence are interpreted, see Kristy 
Martire et al, ‘The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal 
Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect’ (2013) 37(3) Law and Human 
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III   BLACK BOX EVIDENCE 
 
Computer scientists and engineers use the analogy of a black box to describe a 
machine whose input and output behaviour are known, but whose inner workings 
are otherwise opaque. As machines become more efficient at dealing with 
complex tasks, their operations are not only harder to see, they are also more 
difficult to interrogate or explain. A simple locking mechanism is a black box to 
the everyday user, but the mystery of its operation is relatively easy to unveil by 
inspecting its moving parts. On the other extreme, deep learning algorithms that 
are trained to guide self-driving cars, recognise faces, or detect disease in medical 
images comprise many hidden components or ‘layers’ that distribute visual 
information in a way that is exceedingly difficult to explain. 20 There are no visible 
moving parts to a silicon chip. And just as the inner workings of such algorithms 
are obscured by their own complexity and efficiency, so too are the mechanisms 
of the mind. 21 
The black box problem is particularly acute in the legal domain where one 
seeks an explanation for expert opinion (see Part IV below). Transparency as to 
how the expert produced a conclusion in a given case is important because it 
reveals how it could rationally be reproduced at another time, by another expert. 
In other words, transparency is necessary to properly evaluate the reliability of 
expert evidence. But an expert’s thinking is analogous to a black box whose crucial 
inner cognitive processes are not immediately accessible through introspection. 
A consideration in communicating expert evidence, therefore, is the extent to 
which the expert’s recollection of their examination assists the court beyond that 
of their bare opinion. Can they explain their thinking to help reveal its reliability 
to the fact-finder? 
Cognitive scientists use a range of experimental and computational 
techniques to understand how the mind works from a third-person point of view 
without direct observation of mental states.22 Indeed, advances in cognitive 
science are revealing striking differences between the richly detailed conscious 
experience one has of the world and the sparsely detailed unconscious mental 
models that give rise to it.23 Our application of the black box analogy to expert 
evidence refers to one’s limited insight into the cognitive basis of their judgments 
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and decisions from a first-person point of view. A schematic example of black box 
expert evidence is illustrated in Figure 1, with a pair of fingerprints from the same 
finger as ‘input’. The expert relies on complex visual cognitive processes (inside 
the box) to interpret the prints and arrive at an opinion as ‘output’.  
 
Figure 1 — A schematic example of black box evidence with a crime scene or 
‘latent’ print (left) and rolled print (right) from the same finger as 
example ‘input’. Many of the visual cognitive processes relied on by the 
expert to interpret the prints and arrive at a correct judgement proceed 
inside the shaded black box or outside of the expert’s direct awareness. 
Peering more deeply into the box, the expert might glean the gist or overall ‘look’ 
of the prints very quickly,24 with this first impression guiding his or her more 
deliberate search for particular features.25 The expert’s opinion (eg ‘same’, 
‘different’, ‘not enough information to confidently say’) comes into focus as a 
threshold amount of detail is picked up from the prints.26 Their final opinion may 
also be tuned by their experience with similar cases and other aspects of the 
context that are not ‘on the page’.27 Several idiosyncratic facets of the black box 
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Human Behavior 50, 64. 
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are operating outside of the expert’s direct awareness: his or her response 
threshold (eg the amount of visual information required to make a response),28 
response bias (eg tendency to preference one decision over the other),29 and the 
amount of sleep he or she had the night before or the last case he or she worked 
on. 
Next, we consider some basic findings from cognitive science demonstrating 
the tremendous difficulty of (accurately) explaining how a judgment unfolds in 
the mind of an expert. In particular, we will discuss: how people depend on 
pattern recognition or their memories for similar situations to resolve ambiguity; 
how visual pattern evidence, in particular, is not so easily boiled down to a set of 
defined features; and how the automaticity and efficiency with which an expert’s 
thinking proceeds masks the basis of his or her judgment from introspection.  
A   Seeing Patterns 
 
To start, we urge the reader to critically examine the intuition that his or her 
conscious experience is a direct reflection of reality.30 Consider, for instance, how 
easy it is to find structure in the world, even where there is none. This chronic 
tendency to see patterns even in randomness is called apophenia, and it is 
illustrated by several well-known illusions and fallacies of thinking. For instance, 
people see illusory faces in strange places, like tree trunks and toasted cheese 
sandwiches (a quick internet search for the phrase ‘pareidolia’ will bring up many 
such examples). People also hear illusory backward messages in rock music when 
told to listen for specific phrases, such as ‘it’s fun to smoke marijuana’ in Queen’s 
Another One Bites the Dust played in reverse.31 And people even falsely remember 
events that never happened or misremember particular details, like recalling a 
yield or give way sign in place of a stop sign.32 Collectively, these are all examples 
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of expectancy effects33 or confirmation bias,34 where one tends to see, hear and 
remember details in line with their pre-existing mental model of the world.  
This reliance on expectations and similarity to prior experience as a guide to 
the world is fundamental to our everyday functioning; without it we would not be 
able to act or make decisions under conditions of uncertainty.35 Similarly, forensic 
experts are trained to detect patterns in complex samples of handwriting, blood, 
fingerprints, shoeprints and images of various kinds. And just like everyone else, 
their opinions are based on more than what is on the page. That includes their 
prior experiences and expectations, and contextual details surrounding the case 
at hand.36 Without these cognitive shortcuts or ‘heuristics’,37 experts would not 
be able to do what they do.38 But it is the automaticity and efficiency with which 
this kind of pattern recognition operates that obscures it from the user, creating 
the naïve realist impression that one experiences the world unfiltered by the 
mind.39 
B   Blind Reasoning 
 
Pattern recognition is difficult to articulate in legal cases because it eludes the 
mind’s eye. Indeed, people demonstrate a blindness to their own thinking in a 
variety of contexts.40 For example, students cram for exams because it feels more 
effective for remembering content than spreading the same amount of study over 
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38  For an example of fingerprint experts performing more accurately than novices, see Tangen, 
Thompson and McCarthy (n 11). 
39  For a description of naïve realism and the role of interpretation in the context of forensic decision-
making, see Searston, Tangen and Eva (n 27). 
40  Emily Pronin, Daniel Lin and Lee Ross, ‘The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self versus 
Others’ (2002) 28 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 369. 
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time, even though cognitive scientific research says differently.41 Similarly, 
forensic experts’ confidence does not always predict their accuracy in ways one 
might expect.42 Another example of this blind reasoning is that people lack insight 
into the reasons for their decisions, as illustrated by a phenomenon known as 
choice blindness.43 In one study of choice blindness, people were presented with 
two photos of faces. They were then asked which one they found more attractive. 
After making that choice, they were given a closer look at that ‘chosen’ 
photograph and asked to explain why they picked it. The twist was that the 
experimenter used sleight of hand to swap out the chosen picture with the 
discarded one. Most people failed to notice the switch, and many provided 
elaborate explanations of a choice they never made. Simply put, people tell a good 
story to resolve ambiguity, but they are not the best narrator of their unconscious 
cognitive processes. Similarly, forensic experts may not have direct access to the 
reasons for their decisions, even if they feel they do. 
C   Summing Features 
 
The problem with articulating decisions that are born out of unconscious 
cognitive processes is compounded by the fact that many forensic practices 
involve analysing images that are themselves difficult to describe. By way of 
analogy, consider explaining Claude Monet’s artistic style to someone who shares 
your language but who has never seen a painting before. A description of the 
contents of Monet’s famous Water Lilies, for instance, would fail to capture his 
fondness for painting flower gardens, poppy fields, sailboats and sunsets. 
Likewise, any description of his use of colour or the thickness of his brushstrokes 
would be insufficient to distinguish one Impressionist artist from the next. One 
can only appreciate Monet’s style by looking across his different paintings and 
seeing for oneself how they tend to vary from other artistic styles. In fact, even 
when the contents of Impressionist paintings are completely obscured by 
reducing them down to a few pixels, people can still distinguish them from other 
types of paintings.44 One need not be able to describe something in order to 
distinguish it. 
 
                                                                    
41  Sarah Tauber et al, ‘Self-Regulated Learning of a Natural Category: Do People Interleave or Block 
Exemplars during Study?’ (2012) 20(2) Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 356.  
42  Indeed, confidence does not predict accuracy reliably at all in some tasks. For an example in the 
fingerprint context, see Searston and Tangen (n 25). 
43  Petter Johansson et al, ‘Failure to Detect Mismatches between Intention and Outcome in a Simple 
Decision Task’ (2005) 310 Science 5745. 
44  Rachel Searston et al, ‘How Low Can You Go? Detecting Style in Extremely Low Resolution Images’ 
(2019) 45(5) Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 573, 584. 





Explaining the gist or the look of a person’s fingerprints to the fact-finder 
who has never seen a print before is similarly challenging; the contents or 
‘features’ of one print do not reveal much about the variation across prints of the 
same person. Indeed, fingerprint experts can tell if two prints belong to the same 
person even when they are deposited by different fingers (eg Smith’s left thumb 
and index prints).45 In this example, the features may change but examiners can 
still detect the overall look or style of the person’s prints without being able to 
describe it. They can also pick the ‘odd’ pattern out of a grid of 40 different prints 
more efficiently than novices,46 and they can distinguish prints from the same 
finger with very little time to pick out the details.47 In other words, visual pattern 
evidence is more than a sum of features that one can easily explain to the fact-
finder. It is precisely this amorphous quality to visual pattern evidence that is so 
difficult to pry from the mind of an expert witness, and that continues to 
challenge modern computer algorithms attempting to quantify it.48 
D   Articulating Automaticity 
 
Finally, and perhaps paradoxically, it is the years of experience that forensic 
examiners gain that increases the challenge involved in articulating their 
thinking. As one builds experience with images (ie as we become experts with 
them), we develop a mental model of their ‘look’ that enables us to recognise new 
images of the same kind.49 Experts are thought to rely more on similarity to prior 
cases as a shortcut to the correct response (compared with novices who do not 
have the experience to draw on).50 Chess masters, for example, are highly 
accurate at reconstructing chess piece positions from memory.51 More 
experienced chess players can remember pieces in more positions than less 
experienced players, but only when the configuration of pieces is left intact 
resembling their prior experience.52 Likewise, medical residents’ and doctors’ 
diagnostic acumen with skin diseases is improved when the lesion is similar to 
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specific cases they have seen before.53 This increasing reliance on memory with 
expertise, while efficient, also makes it more difficult to pinpoint the source of 
expert decisions.  
Indeed, fingerprint examiners appear to be no different to experts in these 
other perceptual domains. Cognitive scientific research shows that their superior 
performance to novices is specific to prints, both facilitated and constrained by 
their particular set of experiences.54 Research with novice examiners also shows 
that fingerprint discrimination decisions can be influenced by exposure to similar 
cases.55 Applying this research to forensic experts’ interpretations of visual 
pattern evidence more broadly, it is apparent that examiners do not have special 
access to their unconscious cognitive processes. That is, experts (especially) are 
not witnesses to the inner workings of their own minds. And the opaque nature of 
their thinking poses a problem for the fact-finder seeking to understand how they 
have formulated their opinion in the case at hand. 
IV   THE LEGAL (NON-)REGULATION OF BLACK BOX EVIDENCE AT 
COMMON LAW 
 
Now, in the light of the above research, we will assess the orthodox legal response 
to contested expert evidence. The orthodox approach relies on admissibility rules 
and adversarial trial safeguards (eg cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses) to 
ensure that expert evidence is susceptible to rational evaluation.56 We will suggest 
that these mechanisms could, in theory (and especially at common law) be used 
to regulate black box expertise in a safe and scientifically informed manner. 
Unfortunately, they have not been used that way. To illustrate this, we will 
describe the orthodox approach’s application to two cases, both in common-law 
evidence jurisdictions, in which the Crown heavily relied upon the expertise of a 
fingerprint examiner (a black box field): a 2005 South Australian case, R v Bennett 
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A   Admissibility Rules 
 
In Bennett, a fingerprint examiner initially provided a very bare opinion. He said 
that he compared the two relevant fingerprints and found them to be identical: 
‘When I say that something is identical, what I mean is that the impressions were 
made by one person excluding all others.’58 Later, during cross-examination, he 
said that he found over 20 similarities between the latent print and the accused’s, 
but did not take notes as to what they were specifically.59 The Bennett examiner’s 
evidence was — if examined closely enough — telling. It implicitly acknowledged 
the black box nature of the examiner’s expertise in that all he could really say 
about his process was that he compared two prints, found some similarities, and 
determined them to be ‘identical’.60 And while there were over 20 similarities, he 
could not (and did not) say how many are sufficient to declare a match. 
As we saw from the first half of this article, asking an examiner to count the 
similarities that he or she noticed is not a particularly useful way of revealing 
reasoning. This is because expert fingerprint examiners are able to glean 
information from a person’s prints that cannot be reduced down to a number of 
describable details. Indeed, any description of particular similarities risks 
misleading the fact-finder into believing that the fingerprint examination 
process is a simple matter of counting up matching features.  
A better approach would be for examiners to admit the subjective nature of 
the examination and provide scientific evidence on the nature of expertise in the 
domain (eg studies showing how well experts do in cases similar to the present 
one).61 That is not to say that one could perhaps infer based on the Bennett 
examiner’s testimony that his opinion was founded on subjective reasoning 
processes. But that was far from obvious to a lay person. It is now possible for 
experts in such cases to provide knowledge from a growing evidence-base 
exploring the nature of fingerprint expertise and how accurate the process tends 
to be.62 As we will discuss in the remainder of this subsection, expert admissibility 
rules, properly applied, demand this more useful information from experts.63 
 
                                                                    
58  Bennett (Full Court Appeal) (n 57) [16]. See also Edmond, this volume, 332–4, for a review of 
Bennett. 
59  Bennett (Full Court Appeal) (n 57) [19] 
60  Ibid [16]. 
61  For an example of this approach, see Gary Edmond, Matthew Thompson and Jason Tangen, ‘A 
Guide to Interpreting Forensic Testimony: Scientific Approaches to Fingerprint Evidence’ (2013) 
13(1) Law, Probability & Risk 1, 25. 
62  Tangen, Thompson and McCarthy (n 11). 
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We will now review three common-law admissibility rules: (1) the 
requirement that experts identify the intellectual basis and factual underpinnings 
of their expertise (ie the basis rule); (2) the reliability rule; and (3) the exclusion 
of evidence when its prejudice exceeds its probative value. After reviewing these 
rules, we will suggest that they were not appropriately applied in Bennett, leading 
to an outcome in which the trier of fact simply did not have the knowledge needed 
to understand and evaluate the examiner’s conclusions. Bennett also helps 
demonstrate that while the common law is sometimes formally more rigorous 
than the Uniform Evidence Law (‘UEL’) in its approach to expert evidence, those 
differences rarely have any real-world impact.64 In other words, the same 
untested forensic testimony was admitted in both common-law and UEL 
jurisdictions.65  
According to the basis rule, experts must present their evidence in a manner 
that allows the trier of fact to determine how their expertise applies to the 
assumed or observed facts to produce the opinion.66 At common law, this includes 
experts identifying their assumptions, proving the facts they observed, and 
stating their reasoning.67 The statement of reasoning rule is especially important 
in the context of black box evidence because experts’ reasoning consists of 
unverbalisable unconscious cognitive processes that may not be apparent to the 
fact-finder. 
The general purpose of the statement of reasoning requirement is 
transparency as to the ‘expert’s thinking’.68 This will, in theory, assist the fact-
finder in ‘assessing the rational force of expert evidence’.69 The rational force 
includes the reliability of the expert’s process. In other words, the transparency 
required by the basis rule enables ‘the conclusions to be tested and a judgment 
made about the reliability of them’.70 When it comes to scientific and technical 
expertise, the fact-finder should be provided with the ‘necessary scientific 
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criteria’ to evaluate this evidence.71 As we have discussed, black box experts 
cannot state their reasoning in the traditional sense. Still, they can meet some 
necessary scientific criteria by providing: the results of scientific studies 
measuring the performance of similarly trained examiners; their own test scores 
on similar problems; and general research on how experts make decisions (such 
as in Parts II–III above). 
The statement of reasoning rule assists in determining the evidence’s 
admissibility at the next stage of the analysis. To be admissible at common law,72 
the expert must be qualified in a subject that is beyond common knowledge and is 
part of a reliable body of knowledge.73  
As a demonstration of how the reliability rule might be applied in the face of 
black box evidence, consider its application in the recent Liyanage v The State of 
Western Australia (‘Liyanage’) decision.74 In that case, the defence sought to 
adduce evidence from a social worker about the results of two risk assessment 
tools that she had administered to the accused, which purported to quantify the 
degree of danger faced by abused individuals.75 Applying the reliability rule, the 
trial judge (with the appellate court agreeing) held that neither instrument had 
been sufficiently validated and thus should be excluded.76 The trial judge further 
questioned whether the results of instruments could be trusted when they relied 
on the subjective responses of the accused (who may have been motivated to make 
her situation seem more dire): ‘By ascribing numerical values and a score to the 
answers the Scale gives the appearance of being an objective outcome independent of 
the person tested, but it is not that at all.’77 
Finally, the trial judge has a residual discretion to exclude evidence when its 
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.78 At common law, probative 
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value includes the evidence’s reliability (in UEL jurisdictions, reliability’s role is 
much murkier).79 The evidence’s prejudice includes the difficulty the fact-finder 
would have in comprehending the evidence and the possibility that the fact-
finder would accord the evidence undue weight.80 This prejudice is often cast as 
being mitigated by trial safeguards, such as judicial warnings and cross-
examination (of which more below).81  
Applying these rules to Bennett, which predates the NAS, SFI and PCAST 
reports,82 it is apparent there was no reference to measures of accuracy or 
expertise beyond the examiner’s bare identification judgment. And on appeal, 
Bennett challenged the fingerprint evidence for violating the basis rule. He argued 
that the examiner did not provide the factual basis of the opinions (ie descriptions 
and diagrams of the matching features) or fully reveal his reasoning process.83 On 
appeal, Doyle CJ appeared to accept a capacious interpretation of the basis rule,84 
but still found that the examiner’s evidence did not violate it. Most of Doyle CJ’s 
reasons focused on the expert’s failure to provide a photograph of Bennett’s 
fingerprint as a way to explain the similarities that were found.85 Ultimately, 
Doyle CJ held that there was no requirement to tender the photograph and that 
the Magistrate was ‘fully informed’ of the examiner’s ‘reasoning process’.86 The 
result was, according to the Court, that the accused was not cross-examining ‘in 
the dark’.87 In other words, the defence was not forced to go fishing for an 
understanding of how the examiner came to his opinion — the basis was clear. 
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The reasoning in Bennett (and the defence’s specific basis challenge) 
demonstrates a mistaken understanding of the expertise in question and the 
futility of the basis rule in black box cases. By focusing on photographs and points 
of comparisons, all of the parties incorrectly assumed that such information 
would provide the Magistrate some insight into the expert’s reasoning process. 
Rather, expressly pointing to comparisons would not have explained what it was 
like to see the prints through the lens of the expert’s experience, nor would it have 
provided any notion of accuracy. The decision was, however, correct in one facet: 
the defence lawyer was not left to cross-examine in the dark; rather, he was 
forced to cross-examine in the black (box).  
Reliability and probative value versus prejudicial effect were not raised in 
Bennett. However, without knowledge about the method’s error and the 
examiner’s own proficiency, it is difficult to understand how a court could find 
that the opinion was sufficiently reliable or more probative than it was prejudicial. 
By way of contrast, recall that the Liyanage Court demanded validation testing to 
support the reliability of a process whose outputs consisted of subjective 
judgements. It is unclear why jurisprudence on expert judgements about visual 
pattern evidence would be different. 
B   Trial Safeguards 
 
As we saw above, courts sometimes admit expert witnesses under the theory that 
any prejudice associated with their testimony is mitigated by trial safeguards, like 
cross-examination, judicial warnings and rebuttal experts. Beginning with cross-
examination and the example of 2018’s Nguyen case, we now turn to these trial 
safeguards. 
 
1   Cross-Examination 
Nguyen represents an unusually robust challenge to a fingerprint examiner’s 
report.88 In particular, and unlike in Bennett, the defence counsel in Nguyen delved 
not just into the identification at hand, but also asked about ‘the science of 
fingerprinting … generally’ (and some of this was discussed in the examination-
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in-chief as well).89 Nguyen therefore offers a case study into how well cross-
examination — a very strong one — can work in the context of black box 
expertise. In this respect, the cross-examination in Nguyen demonstrates the 
limitations of cross-examination as a tool for revealing the basis of an expert’s 
opinion and provides some lessons for how black box experts may wish to proceed 
in similar cases.90  
As to the fundamental issue of whether fingerprint comparison is a method 
that the expert can verbally articulate, the Nguyen examiner, in chief, described it 
as follows: ‘I believe that whilst there are small subjective elements to the 
process, the overall process is objective … I can look at it. I can see it. I can show it 
to you.’91 This statement somewhat downplays the subjective, black box nature of 
the task.92 To the examiner’s credit, he went on to acknowledge that experts do 
make errors on more difficult comparisons, which he referred to as subjective: 
At that more subjective end where you have, say, pressure distortions or reversals in 
the pattern, you need to be able to explain those and you need to have seen them very 
many times, and experience is a very large part of that … In fact, there was a study here 
in Queensland — or Australia-wide … that showed that with similar but non-matching 
impressions, novices misidentified 55 percent of the images in terms of saying they 
were a match when they, in fact, were not. And experts have a .068 per cent error rate.93 
We note, however, that there are no widely adopted guidelines or pre-set criteria 
on what comparisons represent those on the easy and ‘objective’ end of the 
spectrum, and those on the more difficult subjective end. The quality or clarity of 
a sample is in the eye of the examiner. In other words, it is hard to say in any given 
case whether it is one in which we can trust that an examiner can actually explain 
the process or whether, rather, it is a predominantly black box judgement.94 
Regarding cognitive bias, the Nguyen examiner acknowledged, on cross-
examination, the shortcomings in the fingerprint comparison that led to a 
prominent misidentification in Scotland.95 He explained some of the findings of 
the SFI Report, including the dangers of confirmation bias with a point-based 
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system of counting up some number of feature similarities (eg stopping an 
examination once a set number of similarities confirm a ‘match’ conclusion 
without an exhaustive search for potentially disconfirming differences).96 He was 
also knowledgeable about the mistaken fingerprint identification of Brandon 
Mayfield (by two examiners, who identified him with 100 per cent certainty) as 
the Madrid train bomber, which is widely considered to have been driven by 
cognitive bias.97 He said that he would have not made the same identification, but 
prefaced this with an acknowledgement that he was biased by hindsight, stating: 
‘I have the benefit of hindsight, but I could not objectively … do that with 
sufficient detail and clarity to form my opinion that it would be the same.’98    
The examiner further acknowledged that blind verifications were the ‘gold 
standard’ but explained that this would involve a lengthy process of repeating all 
searches and comparisons in the case that is simply ‘not practical to have 
someone do … Particularly in this instance where it’s a very clear impression. For 
a highly-distorted impression, often other experts are asked to conduct another 
examination.’99 Indeed, scientific evidence suggests that when different 
examiners make independent judgements about the same pair of prints, those 
judgements are more likely to be unanimous when the prints are clear or 
‘pristine’, and less so for the more ambiguous in between cases.100 
Finally, the Nguyen examiner did mention the PCAST Report, citing its 
conclusion that fingerprint analysis is a foundationally valid method.101 This was 
indeed one of the Report’s key conclusions.102 Directly followed by that 
conclusion, however, were cautions about the application of fingerprint 
comparison method by examiners: (1) whether they have undergone proficiency 
testing; (2) whether they have documented the features in the latent print in 
writing before it was compared to the known print; (3) whether they were aware 
of any other facts that may influence the conclusion; and (4) whether the prints 
are of a similar quality to those considered in foundational studies.103  
While he did not directly acknowledge the expressed limitations in the PCAST 
Report, the Nguyen examiner more or less disclosed those points throughout the 
examination. In his examination-in-chief, he offered details about proficiency 
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testing, and even some limitations of fingerprint evidence.104 These included the 
variability in the quality of the impressions and in the ‘experience’ or ‘talent’ of 
the examiner and ‘how they were feeling on the day’.105 He also provided an 
explanation of black box studies and reported error rates that he later expanded 
on during cross-examination.106 As to point (3), the examiner’s knowledge that 
the accused had previously been identified by two or three other examiners was 
provided, but later on cross-examination.107 Still, these points should be offered 
in a straightforward way in the examiner’s initial report because systemic 
imbalances in the criminal justice system make it difficult for many accused 
parties to retain lawyers who will draw out such information.  
Overall, Nguyen demonstrates that experts can provide insight into the 
science behind their expertise as a part of their evidence. However, there is still 
room for improvement in the way examiners explain their thinking and resulting 
conclusions. As we noted above, the examiner emphasised (possible) objective 
components of his task and thus downplayed the role of his experience and 
expertise. He also tended to highlight the parts of scientific reports that were 
favourable to his practice. These aspects of his testimony posed challenges to the 
cross-examining lawyer who did not appear sufficiently well-versed in the 
research to pose further probing questions.108 Still, Nguyen may be favourably 
contrasted with JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (‘JP’), a case recently detailed by 
Edmond and colleagues. 109 In that case, a well-prepared defence counsel similarly 
pressed a fingerprint examiner on reports like that from PCAST.110 The examiner 
in JP was not aware of such reports, making it — in some ways — more difficult 
to convey the relevant scientific knowledge to the trier of fact.111   
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Returning to the basis rule, after the above cross-examination (which 
occurred during a voir dire), the defence in Nguyen argued that the evidence 
should not be admitted: ‘As I said … he has not provided reasons for his decision 
to say it’s a match.’ Despite this challenge to the basis of the examiner’s opinion, 
the Court held: 
[The examiner’s] qualifications were not challenged. Mr Hands, who appears for the 
accused, cited no authorities for his argument that the evidence should be excluded. 
Fingerprint evidence is routinely led in trials in Queensland. [The examiner] is clearly 
qualified to express an expert opinion on the subject matter. The application by the 
accused to exclude the evidence … is dismissed.112 
Cases like Nguyen and Bennett demonstrate the distinct challenges that black box 
experts pose to the cross-examining lawyer. They will not be able to testify about 
the way in which their memory for similar cases may unconsciously inform their 
opinion, nor how they are able to see through distortion and superficial 
differences in visual pattern evidence, nor how their reasoning might have led 
them astray in the presence of biasing or unexpected information without their 
awareness.113 
There are also practical limits on the ability of a lawyer to cross-examine 
experts in the criminal-law context. These are driven by the fact that the defence 
is often underfunded as compared to the prosecution.114 The opaque nature of 
expertise may heighten this disparity by exaggerating the need for the cross-
examining lawyer to have an understanding of the science, which takes time and 
resources. And there are practical constraints on the ability of experts to articulate 
a burgeoning body of scientific evidence on their expertise, too. Keeping apprised 
of the latest research findings takes time and training on top of casework demands.  
 
2   Judicial Directions and Warnings 
Judicial directions suffer from many of the same limitations as cross-
examination. Topics like unconscious thinking and expertise are not common 
knowledge, nor are they sufficiently incontrovertible to be judicially noted under 
 
                                                                    
examiner’s inability to accept them as authoritative — because he was not familiar with them — 
meant that they were not available to impugn his credibility or inform the evaluation of his 
conclusion. They were effectively marginalised in the evaluation of the opinion and the 
determination of guilt. They were not, in effect, (in) evidence.’ 
112  Nguyen (n 57) 1-21. 
113  See above Parts II–III; Edmond (n 79) 147: ‘how, for example, do you effectively cross-examine a 
confident and experienced witness about unconscious influences?’ 
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common law or statute.115 A judge might therefore generally warn the jury about 
the dangers of uncritically accepting expert evidence (eg pursuant to 
recommendations in a bench book).116 However, these warnings would do nothing 
to introduce the type of scientific knowledge required for the jury to assign any 
reasonable weight to black box expert opinion.117  
 
3   Rebuttal Experts 
Rebuttal experts offer another way to introduce knowledge about black box 
experts into the courtroom. The most obvious limitation with respect to this 
adversarial mechanism, however, is resources. It is asking a lot of a criminal 
defendant to both find a rebuttal expert and pay for that expert’s services.118 
Indeed, within forensic science, most practitioners will be affiliated with the 
police in some fashion. Even if an expert is found and the accused can afford that 
expert’s services, such an individual may seem like a hired gun compared to the 
state’s witness.119 Further, if the expert’s retainer is limited to providing evidence 
about the nature of expert decisions in the field (eg the reliability of fingerprint 
examination, as opposed to offering his or her own identification), that expert 
risks being excluded because his or her evidence is not sufficiently probative of 
case facts.120 
V   CONCLUSION: EMBRACE THE DARK? 
 
In the absence of meaningful regulation during the admissibility inquiry, and 
given the limits of adversarial safeguards, a great deal of responsibility rests with 
the experts themselves to provide the fact-finder with the knowledge required to 
evaluate their opinion. In Bennett and Nguyen, we saw experts challenged to 
articulate their thinking about visual pattern evidence in different ways. And, 
accordingly, we saw how difficult it was to interrogate the unconscious cognitive 
basis of their opinions. A description of points of comparison in a pair of 
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fingerprints, for instance, falls short of revealing how they contribute to the 
expert’s opinion.  
But this non-interrogable quality of black box evidence is more a feature of 
expertise than a bug. A large body of research in cognitive science indicates people 
are not privy to the cognitive processes they depend on to make sense of complex 
situations. They are, in fact, so in the dark that they often fail to notice they have 
even made an interpretation at all.121 These findings extend to judgements about 
visual pattern evidence, where it is even harder to appreciate the role of 
experience and context in one’s judgements because the initial interpretative 
process is so immediate and ‘non-analytic’.122 Moreover, the job of interrogating 
one’s own black box may be even harder for experts, who rely more on automatic 
thinking with experience.123  
Nevertheless, expert witnesses are expected to explain their reasoning 
process. They are also expected to provide some estimate of the reliability of their 
evidence. And they are expected to provide an opinion that is susceptible to 
meaningful cross-examination. Here, the forensic expert is confronted with a 
paradox: he or she is called as an expert witness to explain a certain kind of visual 
pattern evidence because he or she possessed perceptual expertise in interpreting 
it. But this same proficiency that qualifies the witness to testify as an expert 
obfuscates the cognitive steps that he or she has taken during his or her 
examination of the evidence.  
So what can experts in such cases do to assist the court? While they may not 
be able to recount what happened in the black box of their mind when they formed 
their opinion, they can educate the court about external aspects of their 
examination process (eg chain of custody from crime scene to court, databases 
and search algorithms, comparison tools and software, contextual details, time 
spent on the examination, and peer review).124 Importantly, they can also provide 
the scientific evidence for their expertise. What are the hallmarks of expert 
decisions in the domain? How do experts differ from novices? Does demonstrable 
expertise emerge with training of the kind completed by the examiner in this 
case? When are experts more likely to make errors with the particular pattern 
evidence at hand? An explanation of the cognitive scientific evidence for the 
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nature of expertise in the field would furnish the court with a third-person 
glimpse into the black box. 
The idea that expert testimony should encompass scientific evidence as a 
means of articulating the basis of an opinion is not new. Several others have 
suggested ways in which model forensic expert witnesses might go about 
articulating research on human performance in their domain.125 Authoritative 
scientific bodies, including the PCAST, have also recommended that quantitative 
information about the accuracy of forensic experts’ judgments be clearly and 
accurately stated in their testimony.126 As a modest addition, we suggest that the 
inclusion of cognitive scientific findings about how experts tend to make decisions 
could help the trier of fact to further interrogate the black box, enabling better 
evaluation of the probative value of the evidence. Exogenous cognitive scientific 
knowledge may have the greatest impact appended to an expert’s written report, 
given the shortcomings of trial safeguards in the context of black box evidence. In 
other words, cognitive scientific research exploring how forensic experts think 
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